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Abstract 
Darkness can conceal identity and encourage moral transgressions; it may also induce a psychological 
feeling of illusory anonymity that disinhibits dishonest and self-interested behavior regardless of actual 
anonymity. Three experiments provided empirical evidence supporting this prediction. In Experiment 1, 
participants in a room with slightly dimmed lighting cheated more and thus earned more undeserved 
money than those in a well-lit room. In Experiment 2, participants wearing sunglasses behaved more 
selfishly than those wearing clear glasses. Finally, in Experiment 3, an illusory sense of anonymity 
mediated the relationship between darkness and self-interested behaviors. Across all three 
experiments, darkness had no bearing on actual anonymity, yet it still increased morally questionable 
behaviors. We suggest that the experience of darkness, even when subtle, may induce a sense of 
anonymity that is not proportionate to actual anonymity in a given situation. 
Keywords  darkness, illusory anonymity, dishonesty, self-interested behavior 
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In “Worship,” Ralph Waldo Emerson (1860/1888) wrote, “As gaslight is the best nocturnal 
police, so the universe protects itself by pitiless publicity” (p. 214). This quote expresses an inherent 
aspect of darkness: Darkness conceals identity and decreases inhibitions. Indeed, criminal assaults are 
most frequent during hours of darkness (Hartley, 1974; Karnes, 1960), and dark rooms promote 
aggressive behavior (Page & Moss, 1976). This licensing effect of darkness might have contributed to the 
popularization of streetlights in urban landscapes during the 19th century (Bouman, 1987). 
 Darkness can disinhibit criminal acts and moral transgressions by producing anonymity. 
Unethical acts are more likely when transgressors cannot be identified. In The Republic, Plato told the 
story of the ring of Gyges, which granted its owner the power of invisibility and eventually led to the 
owner’s corruption. Similarly, Zimbardo (1969) showed that participants dressed in concealing hoods 
and baggy clothing delivered longer electric shocks to strangers than did participants wearing regular 
clothing. The same effect has also been found for unrestrained, impulsive, and uncontrolled behavior 
when individuals experience anonymity or deindividuation through their association with a group (e.g., 
Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952; Singer, Brush, & Lublin, 1965). 
 Departing from this body of work, we suggest that darkness does more than simply produce 
conditions of actual anonymity. We contend that darkness may create a sense of illusory anonymity that 
disinhibits self-interested and unethical behaviors. Individuals in a room with slightly dimmed lighting or 
people who have donned a pair of sunglasses may feel anonymous not because the associated darkness 
significantly reduces others’ ability to see or identify them, but because they are anchored on their own 
phenomenological experience of darkness. When individuals in such circumstances experience darkness 
and, consequently, impaired vision, they generalize that experience to others, expecting that others will 
conversely have difficulty perceiving or seeing them. Piaget (1936) described this kind of egocentrism 
among young children. In one study (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956), children were presented with a three-
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dimensional model of a scene with a small doll sitting opposite them and were asked to describe what 
the doll saw. Children between the ages of 4 and 7 tended to identify an image that showed what they 
saw despite the difference in the scene that would be viewed from the doll’s position. Even though 
adults are better able to take others’ perspectives, they never completely grow out of egocentrism (e.g., 
Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, adults tend to 
overestimate the extent to which their thoughts, feelings, and sensations are accessible to others 
because they are anchored on their own experience, using it as a starting point to predict others’ 
experiences (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998). Thus, just as children playing hide-and-seek will close 
their eyes and believe that others cannot see them, the experience of darkness may lead adults to feel 
they are hidden from others regardless of whether that is actually true. We propose that this illusory 
anonymity can consequently license unethical behaviors. 
 Three experiments tested whether darkness can license dishonesty and self-interested 
behaviors. In Experiment 1, we manipulated environmental dimness and examined whether participants 
cheated to earn undeserved money. In Experiment 2, we examined the extent to which people would 
act selfishly in a dictator game while wearing sunglasses versus clear glasses. Finally, Experiment 3 
examined whether subjective perceptions of anonymity mediated the licensing effect of wearing 
sunglasses. 
 
Experiment 1: Cheating in a Dim Room 
A central aspect of our prediction is that darkness can license self-interested and unethical 
behaviors regardless of actual anonymity. In Experiment 1, we controlled for actual anonymity by having 
participants engage in an individual task in which no identifying information was revealed and 
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participants’ choices could not be traced. We manipulated the lighting of the room in which the task 
took place and examined whether room dimness promoted cheating. 
 Eighty-four college students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (40 female, 44 
male; average age = 20.54 years) participated in the study for a maximum payment of $12. Participants 
received a $2 fee for showing up and had the opportunity to earn an extra $10. They were randomly 
assigned to one of two conditions (dim room vs. control room) upon arrival. The well-lit, or control, 
room (15 ft × 14 ft) was illuminated by 12 fluorescent lights mounted to the ceiling. The dim room was 
similar in size, but was lit by 4 fluorescent lights; the participants could see each other and the 
experimental material, but this room was visibly dimmer than the well-lit room. Participants in the dim-
room condition were simply told that some of the lights were out. 
 For the task, participants received a brown envelope that contained $10 (nine $1 bills and four 
quarters) and an empty white envelope, along with two sheets of paper. The first paper was a 
worksheet with 20 matrices, each consisting of 12 three-digit numbers (e.g., 4.78; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 
2008). The second paper was a collection slip on which participants were to report their performance 
and answer demographic questions. On the back of the collection slip we included instructions for the 
task and a different matrix as an example. 
 Participants were told that they would have 5 min to find two numbers in each matrix that 
added up to 10. For each pair of numbers correctly identified, they would keep $0.50 from their supply 
of money; they were also asked to transfer the remaining amount to the white envelope and drop it in a 
designated box along with the collection slip. Note that 5 min is not enough time to solve all 20 
matrices. In previous studies (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Mazar et al., 2008), people were able to find 7 
of the 20 pairs on average during this amount of time. In addition, there was no apparent identifying 
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information anywhere on the two sheets, so results seemed anonymous. Thus, participants had both an 
incentive and the opportunity to over-report their performance to earn more money. 
 All participants received the same matrices to solve, except that a single number was unique for 
each participant. One of the three-digit numbers in the matrix used as an example on the back of each 
collection slip matched the unique number on the corresponding test sheet. This allowed us to match 
the worksheet with the collection slip of each participant and compute the difference between self-
reported performance and actual performance. This difference score was our main dependent variable. 
Positive difference scores indicate that participants over-reported their performance and cheated on the 
task. 1 
 After the 5-min task, participants in both conditions wrote down on the collection slip the 
number of matrices they had solved correctly. They dropped the collection slip and the remaining 
money in one box and the matrices sheet in another box located in a different corner of the room. 
 A t test revealed that there were no significant differences in actual performance between the 
two conditions (𝑀𝑀 = 7.26 correct,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 2.27, vs.𝑀𝑀 = 6.96 correct, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 2.49), 𝑡𝑡(82) < 1,𝑝𝑝 =.56,𝑝𝑝rep = .46. However, we found significant differences in self-reported performance, 𝑡𝑡(82) =4.48,𝑝𝑝 < .001,𝑝𝑝rep > .99. Participants in the control room reported a lower number of correctly solved 
matrices (𝑀𝑀 = 7.78, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 3.09) than did participants in the dim room (𝑀𝑀 = 11.47,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 4.32). This 
resulted in a difference of $1.85 in actual payout. We found that cheating was greater in the dim room 
than in the control room both when we examined the average number of matrices by which participants 
overstated their performance (𝑀𝑀 = 4.21,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 4.12, vs.𝑀𝑀 = 0.83,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 1.58), 𝑡𝑡(82) = 4.92,𝑝𝑝 <.001,𝑝𝑝rep > .99, and when we examined the percentage of participants who overstated their 
performance (𝑀𝑀 = 60.5%,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 50%, vs.𝑀𝑀 = 24.4%,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 44%),𝑥𝑥2(1,𝑁𝑁 = 84) = 11.15,𝑝𝑝 =.001,𝑝𝑝rep = .99.  
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 These results provide strong support for the predicted relationship between darkness and 
cheating. Although early studies such as the one by Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1980) manipulated 
dimness and measured its effect on aggressive behaviors, in these studies room dimness was 
manipulated along with other factors, such as white noise and confidentiality of personal information; 
thus, the causal relationship between darkness and cheating has not previously been established. In our 
first experiment, the task was completely anonymous, and the only difference across conditions was 
room dimness. We found that a slightly dim room increased cheating above and beyond the effect of 
guaranteed anonymity. 
 
Experiment 2: “Shades” and Self-Interested Behavior 
As we mentioned earlier, a useful metaphor for the illusory anonymity induced by darkness is 
the example of children playing hide-and-seek, who close their eyes and believe that others cannot see 
them. In Experiment 2, we tested this idea by having some participants wear a pair of sunglasses (and 
others wear clear glasses 2) while engaging in an on-line task without expectation of face-to-face 
interaction. Clearly, the fact that one is wearing a pair of sunglasses should not impair other people’s 
sight, especially when there is no face-to-face interaction. Nevertheless, because darkness induces 
illusory anonymity, we expected that participants wearing sunglasses would be more likely than those 
wearing clear glasses to behave selfishly in an anonymous dictator game. 
 Fifty students at the University of Toronto volunteered (31 female, 19 male; average age = 21.36 
years) for a maximum payment of $11. Participants received a $5 fee for showing up and had the 
opportunity to earn up to $6 during the study. The experiment had a one-factor (sunglasses vs. clear 
glasses) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to “test” either a pair of 
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sunglasses or a pair of clear glasses while completing some “unrelated” tasks. We purposely selected 
oversized glasses so that participants who came in with their own glasses could wear the experimental 
glasses on top of their own. 
 The supposedly unrelated task involved an ostensible interpersonal interaction with a stranger 
in a different room. The interaction was a typical one-shot dictator game that included two roles, 
initiator and recipient. The initiator had $6 to allocate between him- or herself and the recipient. 
Initiators kept whatever they did not offer; recipients could choose to accept or reject the offer, but 
their choices did not affect initiators’ outcomes. Although participants were told they had been 
randomly assigned to a role, they all played the initiator against the experimenter. We emphasized that 
participants would not see or talk to their counterparts during or after the experiment—all the 
interactions would be mediated by a computer program. This ensured that the sunglasses did not affect 
actual anonymity or visibility of facial expressions. The experiment ended after participants made their 
choice; they then answered a few demographic questions and were paid $5 plus the amount they kept 
for themselves in the dictator game. 
 Participants offered between $0 and $6 (𝑀𝑀 = 2.24,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 1.62). As expected, those who wore 
sunglasses gave significantly less (𝑀𝑀 = $1.81,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = $1.30) than those who wore clear glasses (𝑀𝑀 = $2.271,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 1.83), 𝑡𝑡(48) = 2.02,𝑝𝑝 = .049,𝑝𝑝rep = .88.  Also, participants in the sunglasses 
condition gave significantly less than the fair division (i.e., $3), 𝑡𝑡(25) = −4.688,𝑝𝑝 < .01,𝑝𝑝rep > .95, 
whereas the amount given by those in the control condition was not significantly different from the fair 
division, 𝑡𝑡(23) = 0.78,𝑝𝑝 = .44,𝑝𝑝rep = .54. These results are consistent with those of Experiment 1 and 
provide even stronger evidence that darkness can license dishonest and self-interested behaviors 
through illusory anonymity: Wearing a pair of sunglasses should have no bearing on anonymity in an on-
line task without face-to-face interaction. 
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Experiment 3: “Shades” and Perceived Anonymity 
In Experiment 3, we directly examined perceived anonymity as a mediator of the licensing effect 
of darkness on self-interested behaviors. Experiment 3 employed the same design and procedure as 
Experiment 2 except that we included a five-item measure of perceived anonymity (see Table 1) after 
the dictator game. These items captured the extent to which participants felt anonymous and thought 
that others were not paying attention to them and their choices during the dictator game (α = .93). 
Participants indicated their agreement with each item on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree). 
 Eighty-three students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill participated (39 female, 
44 male; average age = 20.71 years) for a maximum payment of $11 ($5 fee for showing up and 
potential earnings up to $6). On average, participants offered $2.35 (SD = $1.43). As expected, those 
who wore sunglasses gave significantly less (M = $1.93, SD = $1.27) than did those who wore clear 
glasses (𝑀𝑀 = 2.76,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 1.46), 𝑡𝑡(81) = −2.77,𝑝𝑝 < .01,𝑝𝑝rep > .95. Also, participants in the sunglasses 
condition gave significantly less than the fair division (i.e., $3), 𝑡𝑡(40) = −5.40,𝑝𝑝 < .001,𝑝𝑝rep > .99, 
whereas the amount given by those in the clear-glasses condition was not significantly different from 
the fair division, 𝑡𝑡(41) = −1.06,𝑝𝑝 = .30,𝑝𝑝rep = .65. These results fully replicated the findings of 
Experiment 2. 
 Further, participants who wore sunglasses reported feeling more anonymous during the study 
(M = 4.73, SD = 1.10) than did those who wore clear glasses (𝑀𝑀 = 4.01,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 1.17), 𝑡𝑡(81) = 2.87,𝑝𝑝 <.01,𝑝𝑝rep > .95. We examined whether this perceived anonymity mediated the effects of darkness on 
the amount participants offered in the dictator game (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The effect of wearing 
sunglasses was reduced to non-significance (from β = −0.29,𝑝𝑝 < .01,𝑝𝑝rep > .95, to β = −0.09,𝑝𝑝 =.28,𝑝𝑝rep = .66) when perceived anonymity was included in the equation, and perceived anonymity was  
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a significant predictor of the offered amount �β = −0.67,𝑝𝑝 < .001,𝑝𝑝rep > .99�. A bootstrap analysis 
showed that the 99% bias-corrected confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero 
([−0.77, −0.75]), suggesting a significant indirect effect (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007). These 
results show that perceived anonymity mediated the effect of darkness on selfish behavior. 
 
General Discussion 
Imagine that a person who is alone in a closed room is deciding whether to lie to a total stranger 
in an e-mail. Clearly, whether the room is well lit would not affect the person’s actual level of 
anonymity. Nevertheless, darkness may license unethical behavior in such situations. Across three 
studies, we found that darkness, induced by room dimness (Experiment 1) or wearing sunglasses 
(Experiments 2 and 3), licensed self-interested and cheating behavior. In addition, an illusory sense of 
anonymity seems to have mediated this licensing effect of darkness (Experiment 3). Darkness appears to 
induce a false sense of concealment, leading people to feel that their identities are hidden. 
 It is important to note that across all three experiments, our darkness manipulations did not 
have any bearing on actual anonymity. In Experiment 1, we manipulated darkness by dimming the lights. 
Although the room in the experimental condition was darker than the one in the control condition, 
participants had no trouble seeing and identifying each other. In Experiments 2 and 3, we manipulated 
darkness simply by asking participants to wear a pair of sunglasses. The task used in these latter two 
experiments was fully mediated by computers, and participants did not expect to see or talk to the 
recipient of their offer during or after the experiment. Further, the task was designed so that it promised 
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complete anonymity. Nevertheless, in each of these studies, darkness increased dishonesty and self-
interested behaviors. 
 Previous studies have treated darkness as just one of many factors that induce a state of 
deindividuation (e.g., Zimbardo, 1969), but out studies suggest that the experience of darkness, 
combined with the difficulty of transcending one’s own phenomenological experience, triggers a 
fundamental psychological belief that one is protected from others’ attention and inspections. Our 
results suggest that darkness, even experienced one-sidedly through the act of wearing sunglasses, can 
have potentially harmful consequences. Thus, Emerson may have been correct when he stated that 
good lamps are the best police. 
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Notes 
1. No participant underreported his or her performance. 
2. The glasses did not have prescription lenses. 
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Table 1. Items Used to Measure Perceived Anonymity and 
Concealed Identity in Experiment 3 
1. I was watched during the study.* 
2. I was anonymous during the study. 
3. My choice went unnoticed during the study. 
4. My identity was not known to others during the study. 
5. Others were paying attention to my behavior during the study.* 
Note: Reverse-scored items are indicated by asterisks. 
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